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CURRENT LEGISLATION
AMENDMENT TO THE .PENAL LAW RELATING TO THE POSSESSION
OF WIRE TAPPING INSTRUMENTS.-With the recent enactment of
Section 552-a of the Penal Law,1 the New York Legislature has re-
asserted the public policy of the state by declaring the possession of
wire tapping instruments to be a crime. New York has long pro-
claimed wire tapping itself to be a criminal offense,2 just as it has
prohibited the wrongful divulgence of the contents of telegraphic and
telephonic communications. However, the gathering of evidence by
means of surreptitiously tapping public and private telephone lines
continues without regard to the legislative mandates. The inability
of past legislative measures to eliminate or to drastically curtail this
invasion of the privacy of one's conversations and thoughts is promi-
nently spotlighted by the apparent disrespect in which these statutes
were held,4 and was instrumental in the enactment of Section 552-a.
Historically, the New York Legislature assumed an attitude
akin to passive acquiescence in regard to the obtaining of evidence by
means of the wire tap, for remedial legislation not only was slow in
arriving but moreover proved to be of little or no value.5 A more apt
example of such legislative frailty than Section 1423 (6) of the Penal
Law 6 could not be desired.
Section 639(7) of the Penal Code of 1881 forbade displacement,
removal, injury or destruction of telegraph lines or apparatus. By
1 Laws of N. Y. 1949, c. 519.2N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1423(6). See note 5 infra.
8 N. Y. PM.L LAw § 552. See note 10 infra.
4 A timely example of this unwholesome attitude is the tapping of the
telephone lines of the mayor of New York City. On March 11, 1949, Mayor
William O'Dwyer discovered a plot to tap his telephone, together with the tele-
phones of other city officials (N. Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1949, p. 20, col. 4). He
immediately sponsored a bill to place wire tapping instruments in the same
category as burglary tools, patterning his bill along the same general lines as
Section 408 of the Penal Law, which deals with burglary tools (N. Y. Times,
Mar. 23, 1949, p. 1, col. 1). Although the O'Dwyer sponsored bill, known as
the Quinn-Steingut amendment, was severely criticized by the Federal Bar
Association of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut (N. Y. Times, Mar.
26, 1949, p. 10, col. 1), it was enacted into law as Section 552-a of the Penal
Law when Governor Thomas E. Dewey signed the measure on April 12, 1949
(N. Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1949, p. 32, col. 3).
5 See Rosenzweig, Tie Law of Wire Tapping, 32 CoPx. L. Q. 514 (1947)
and 33 CoaR. L. Q. 73 (1947), for a most valuable and complete study of this
subject.
6 The salient portion of the statute is as follows: "A person who wilfully
or maliciously displaces, removes, injures, or destroys: . . .6. A line of tele-
graph or telephone wire or cable, pier or abutment, or the material or property
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New York Laws of 1892, Chapter 372, Section 639(7) was amended
so as to be the same, in substance, as the present Section 1423(6),
which declares unlawful wire tapping to be a crime. Since the pres-
ent statute is included in Article 134 of the Penal Law, which con-
cerns malicious mischief, it was not altogether strange for the courts
to set the requisite intent at ". . . something more than a voluntary
act, and more also than an intentional act which in fact is wrongful." 7
This high standard requiring proof of a malicious intent has not been
successfully challenged," and Section 1423(6) has thereby been ren-
dered ineffective in the battle against wire tapping because of strict
belonging thereto, without lawful authority, or who shall unlawfully and wil-
fully cut, break, tap, or make connection with any telegraph or telephone line,
wire, cable or instrument, or read or copy in any unauthorized manner any
message, communication, or report passing over it, in this state; . .. ; or
who shall aid, agree with, employ or conspire with any person or persons to
unlawfully do, or permit or cause to be done, any of the acts hereinbefore
mentioned, .. . Is punishable by imprisonment for not more than two years."
7 Wass v. Stephens, 128 N. Y. 123, 128, 28 N. E. 21, 23 (1891). This
dictum is quoted approvingly in Hewitt v. Newburger, 141 N. Y. 538, 36 N. E.
593 (1894), reversing 66 Hun 230, 20 N. Y. Supp. 913 (Sup. Ct. 1892) ; People
v. Raeder, 161 Misc. 557, 292 N. Y. Supp. 447 (Co. Ct. 1937) ; People v. Gillies,
57 Misc. 568, 109 N. Y. Supp. 945 (Sup. Ct. 1907); People v. Bates, 79 Hun
584, 29 N. Y. Supp. 894 (Sup. Ct. 1894).
s "The district attorney attempts to make a distinction between the provi-
sions of section 1423. He contends that the portion of the statute which.pro-
vides: That 'A person who wilfully or maliciously displaces, removes, injures
or destroys. . . . A line of telegraph or telephone, wire or cable, . . . ,' is
distinguishable from the language of the same section which provides: 'or who
shall unlawfully and wilfully cut, break, tap, or make connection with any
telegraph or telephone line.' He calls our attention to the fact that the first
provision is disjunctive and reads 'wilfully or maliciously,' while the second
part of the section above quoted is ih the conjunctive and reads 'or who shall
unlawfully and wilfully cut,' etc. However, the courts have interpreted the
word 'wilfully' to include unlawfully and the same is true as to the word 'mali-
ciously.' So that it does not make much difference whether the words are used
conjunctively or disjunctively.
"'The word "wilfully" in the statute means something more than a volun-
tary act, and more also than an intentional act which in fact is wrongful. It
includes the idea of an act intentionally done with a wrongful purpose, or with
a design to injure another, or one committed out of mere wantonness or law-
lessness.' (Wass v. StepJwits, 128 N. Y. 123.)
"'The act is malicious when the thing done is with the knowledge of
plaintiff's rights and with the intent to interfere therewith. In a legal sense
it means a wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse.'
(Lamnb v. Cheney & Son, 227 N. Y. 418.)
"'It consists in the intentional doing of a wrongful act without justifica-
tion.' (People v. Knapp, 152 Misc. 368.)
"This is a penal statute and must be strictly construed. The act of the
defendant was intentional, headstrong and voluntary. In order to find him
guilty of the crime charged the court must find that his act was wantonly mali-
cious and done with desire and intention to injure the complainant and destroy
its property." People v. Raeder, 161 Misc. 557, 561, 292 N. Y. Supp. 447, 452
(Co. Ct. 1937).
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construction by the courts,' and the unanswered need for more effec-
tive phraseology by the legislature.' 0
Section 552 of the Penal Law " presents a similarly stunted de-
velopment. It has been judicially stated that its purpose ". . . was
intended to preserve telephone and telegraph messages from wrongful
use by employees." 12 Strict construction by the courts once more
produced a statute as ineffective as Section 1423 (6) ,'1 and the paucity
of cases interpreting Section 552 left its past, as its future, clouded
with uncertainty. 14
With the advent of 1938, the constitution of the State of New
York was amended so as to sanction the issuance of ex parte orders
permitting legal wire tapping.'5 Then, in 1942, Section 813-a of the
Code of Criminal Procedure 16 was enacted, and New York became
the first state to provide a procedure for supervised wire tapping.17
In substance, the statute authorizes the issuance of an ex parte order
for the interception of telegraphic or telephonic communications by
a justice of the supreme court, a judge of a county court, or a judge
of New York County General Sessions Court. Said order must be
applied for by the district attorney, the attorney-general, or any offi-
cer of a police department above the rank of sergeant, the applicant
stating under oath that there is reasonable ground to believe that evi-
dence of a crime may be obtained in such manner. The justice or
judge may examine under oath the applicant or any witnesses in order
, Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping, 33 CORN. L. Q. 73, 86 (1947).
l It is noteworthy to observe that, aside from the numerical rearrangement
of Section 1423(6) by Laws of N. Y. 1911, c. 316, this section has not been
amended since 1892.
'1The salient portion of the statute is as follows: "A person who:
1. Wrongfully obtains or attempts to obtain any knowledge of a telegraphic or
telephonic message by connivance with a clerk operator messenger or other
employee of a telegraph or telephone company; or 2. Being such clerk operator
messenger or other employee wilfully divulges to anyone but the person for
whom it was intended the contents or the nature thereof of a telegraphic or
telephonic message or dispatch intrusted to him for the transmission or de-
livery or of which contents he may in any way become possessed . . . : and
any violation of this section . . . . is punishable by a fine of not more than
one thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or by
both such fine and imprisonment."
12 People v. McDonald, 177 App. Div. 806, 810, 165 N. Y. Supp. 41, 45 (2d
Dep't 1917).
13 Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tappinq, 33 CORN. L. Q. 73, 86 (1947).
14 It may safely be said that Section 552 accomplishes little more than the
manifestation of New York's public policy on the divulgence of the contents
of telegraphic and telephonic communications. Only People v. McDonald.
supra note 11, and an opinion written by the attorney-general officially appeared
to shed any light upon the usefulness and application of the statute.
15 N. Y. CoN ST. Art. I, § 12.
:1 Laws of N. Y. 1942, c. 924.
17 The procedure provided by Section 813-a seems to have been designed
"to insure secrecy in the issuance of the order and thus preserve the value of
the wire tapping operation." Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping, 33 CORN.
L. Q. 73, 88 (1947).
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to determine whether or not reasonable grounds exist for the issuance
of the order. If the order is issued, it is only effective for the period
of time specified therein, but not for a period of more than six months
unless extended by the justice or judge who issued the original order;
and the justice or judge must retain a true copy of the order at all
times.
In such manner the framework was laid for a supervised wire
tapping system. Although there has been severe criticism for a more
stringent supervision of official tapping,'8 together with penalties for
violations of the constitutional and statutory mandates, the legislature
has seemingly deemed it more expedient to permit Section 813-a to
function as it was originally enacted.19
Such was the statutory law of New York in regard to wire tap-
ping until April 11, 1949, when Section 552-a of the Penal Law 20
became effective. The situation created by the inability of former
legislation to suppress the illegal wire tap, for which the courts were
partly responsible, was hoped to be remedied by the new measure.
Therefore, the malicious intent required by Section 1423(6)21 was
omitted, since a requisite intent of ". . . something more than a vol-
untary act, and more also than an intentional act which in fact is
wrongful" 22 would render a new legislative decree as impotent as
past ones. Instead, the essential elements of the new statute were
defined as being: (1) possession of instruments, (2) the instruments
must be designed or commonly used for wire tapping or the inter-
ception of telephonic communication, (3) the possession must be
under circumstances evincing an intent to use the instruments
unlawfully.23
Is See note 3 supra in regard to the position taken by the Federal Bar Asso-
ciation of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.
'9 The constitutionality of Article I, Section 12, of the New York Consti-
tution and of Section 813-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure are currently
being questioned in a proceeding pending in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, the hearing of which is scheduled for October 26,
1949. Said proceeding, civil action file number 50-393, arose on a motion made
by Herman Hoffman and the New York County Criminal Courts Bar Asso-
ciation, directed against William O'Brien, Frank Hogan, and Nathaniel Gold-
stein, to adjudge the aforementioned provisions unconstitutional and in violation
of Section 605, Title 47 of the United States Code, and to enjoin the further
issuance of ex pare orders. This proceeding warrants close scrutiny.
20 Laws of N. Y. 1949, c. 519. The full text of the amendment is as
follows: "A person who has in his possession any device, contrivance, machine
or apparatus designed or commonly used for wire tapping or the interception
of telephone communications under circumstances evincing an intent to unlaw-
fully use or employ or allow the same to be so used or employed for wire tap-
ping or interception of telephone communications, or knowing the same are
intended to be so used, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and if he has been
previously convicted of any crime, he shall be guilty of a felony."21 See note 5 supra.
22 See note 6 supra and text. Also see note 7 supra.
23 See note 19 supra.
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Because of the close similarity between Section 408 of the Penal
Law,2 4 after which Section 552-a was patterned,2 5 and the new stat-
ute, both in the requisite elements of the respective crimes and in the
purposes of the statutes, it is not inconceivable that the courts will
rely heavily upon their past interpretations of Section 408 in order
to enlighten their future construction of Section 552-a. Since Section
408 only required "circumstances evincing an intent" to unlawfully
use burglary instruments, an intent likewise required by Section
552-a, the courts have found Section 408 an able instrumentality for
the suppression of crime. "The statute [Section 408] indicates three
elements as necessary to constitute a crime, that is, (1) possession of
tools, . . . , (2) the tools must be adapted, designed, or commonly
used for the commission of burglary, . . , (3) the possession must
be under circumstances evincing an intent to use or employ the tools
or allow the same to be used or employed in the commission of a
crime .... ," 26 One may be convicted under Section 408 if there was
an intent to commit any crime, whether or not the crime be morally
wrong.27 If the prosecution establishes the carrying of the tools by
the defendant and his intention to use them, the conviction is sus-
tainable whether or not the defendant's intention was to use the tools
within or without the confines of New York State.28 The implements
or tools found on the person or in the possession of the individual
apprehended do not necessarily have to be adapted solely to the crime
of burglary. As was stated in People v. Morgan,29 "if the implements
found on the person were adapted to the commission of crime, and
the circumstances justified a finding of an intent to use them to com-
mit crime, the statute [now Section 408] covers the case even if
the implements or tools could be used innocently in legitimate
business." 30
24 The full text of the statute is as follows: "A person who makes or
mends, or causes to be made or mended, or has in his possession in the day or
night time, any engine, machine, tool, false key, picklock, bit, nippers or imple-
ments adapted, designed or commonly used for the commission of burglary,
larceny or other crime, under circumstances evincing an intent to use or em-
ploy, or allow the same to be used or employed, in the commission of a crime,
or knowing that the same are intended to be so used, shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor, and if he has been previously convicted of any crime, he is guilty
of a felony."25 See note 3 mtpra.
28 Parenthetical material added. People v. Birnbaur, 208 App. Div. 476,
479, 203 N. Y. Supp. 697, 699 (1st Dep't 1924). It is apparent that the re-
spective elements required by Section 552-a and by Section 408 are identical.27 United States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F. 2d 399 (C. C. A. 2d 1939),
reversing 27 F. Supp. 135 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
28 People v. Reilly, 47 App. Div. 218, 63 N. Y. Supp. 18 (1st Dep't 1900),
aff'd, 164 N. Y. 600, 59 N. E. 1128 (1900).29 59 Hun 619, 13 N. Y. Supp. 448 (Sup. Ct. 1891).30 Parenthetical material added. People v. Morgan, 59 Hun 619, 13 N. Y.
Supp. 448, 449 (Sup. Ct. 1891).
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Thus the wide latitude permitted by Section 408 is readily ap-
parent. Vill this same broad application be given to Section 552-a?
Because of the ineffectiveness of Sections 1423(6) and 552, it is sub-
mitted that the question must be answered in the affirmative. Only
by such a construction will New York find itself in a position to
effectively combat illegal wire tapping and to reinforce Governor
Thomas E. Dewey's remark that Section 552-a "should serve to wipe
out the nasty business of private wire tapping." 31
However, a serious problem remains-one with which neither
Section 552-a nor any previously enacted legislation are concerned.
This aspect of the law of wire tapping is a segment of the law of evi-
dence, resting almost entirely upon decisional law, and dealing with
the question of admissibility of illegally obtained evidence. Two
views prevail as to whether or not illegally seized evidence should be
admissible-the federal view, with which the minority are in accord,32
and the English-majority view, to which thirty states, including New
York,33 adhere.34
In Weeks v. United States,3 5 the federal courts held that the
use of illegally obtained evidence was unconstitutional 3> and there-
fore such evidence was inadmissible.37 Later, the United States
Supreme Court, in Olmstead v. United States,3 s held that wire tap-
ping was not a search or seizure within the prohibition of the Fourth
Amendment, 9 and therefore evidence obtained in such a manner was
admissible."0 However, the Ohnstead doctrine was destined for little
31 N. Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1949, p. 32, col. 3.
32 See Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping, 33 CORN. L. Q. 73, 74, 75
(1947).
33 People v. Adams, 176 N. Y. 351, 68 N. E. 636 (1903), aff'd, Adams v.
New York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904); People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E.
585 (1926).
34 See note 31 supra.
35232 U. S. 383 (1914).
3 Although the court based its decision upon violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment, which guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures, matters
of policy played no small part in influencing the court.
37The leading case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), was
the first United States Supreme Court decision to set forth a view directly
opposed to the common law doctrine of admissibility of illegally obtained evi-
dence. The view expressed in the Boyd case, which was based upon violation
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, prevailed until 1904, when the Supreme
Court of the United States upheld the New York Court of Appeals, which
sanctioned the English and majority view of admissibility, in Adams v. New
York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904). The dictum in the Adams case conflicted with
the Boyd doctrine and it was not until the decision in the Weeks case that the
federal position became firmly established.
38277 U. S. 438 (1928).
39 U. S. CONST. AmEaN. IV.
40 The court distinguished Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 (1921),
which had affirmed the Weeks doctrine against admissibility, stating there
"... there was an actual entrance into the private quarters of defendant and
the taking away of something tangible. Here we have testimony only of vol-
1949 ]
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more than embryonic development, for in 1934, Section 605 of the
Federal Communications Act 41 was enacted. Section 605 prohibits
any person not authorized by the sender from intercepting, divulging,
or publishing to another any interstate or foreign communications
sent by wire or radio, and also prohibits federal agents from testify-
ing as to evidence procured by tapping, whether the intercepted con-
versations were interstate or intrastate calls, unless said agents had
been authorized to procure such information by the sender. In
Nardone v. United States,42 the United States Supreme Court, since
it was interpreting a statute and not the Constitution, held that Sec-
tion 605 forbids the admission of intercepted messages into evidence
in all proceedings of any nature, whether obtained by a federal agent,
the local police authorities, or a private citizen. 43 It was decided, in
Weiss v. United States,44 that Section 605 prohibits the introduction
of evidence secured through interception of intrastate messages, but
this holding is limited to the federal jurisdiction and is not controlling
in state courts. 45  Thus, the federal doctrine became firmly estab-
lished that evidence secured by means of illegal and unauthorized
wire tapping is inadmissible.
The majority of the states uphold the English view that the
illegal manner by which evidence is obtained is not a valid objection
to its admissibility if it is relevant to the issue.46 "The reason usually
assigned for ignoring the method by which the evidence was obtained
was that the court would not halt the progress of the trial to deter-
mine a 'collateral' issue, having no bearing -on the outcome of the
litigation at hand." 47 Except for a brief period in the 1920s, the
case law of New York has been most uniform. The New York
position was settled by the leading case of People v. Adams, 48 which
untary conversations secretly overheard." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S.
438, 464 (1928).
4148 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U. S. C. §605 (1946).
42302 U. S. 379 (1937).
43 Compare with Weeks v. United States, supra note 34 and text, which
limits its holding to the Federal Government and its agents, expressly exclud-
ing state and municipal agents. Although the Nardone doctrine has been sub-
sequently modified slightly, such is of passing import to this summary of the
subject at hand.
44308 U. S. 321 (1939), reversing United States v. Weiss, 103 F. 2d 348
(C. C. A. 2d 1939).
45 See note 54 infra for a terse expression as to the effect of the Weiss
case in New York.
46 8 WIGMORE, EVmDENCE § 2183 (3d ed. 1940); 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENcE§254a (15th ed. 1892).47 Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping, 32 CORN. L. Q. 514, 517 (1947).
"The only question before the trial court is the relevancy and materiality as
evidence of such papers, documents, or conversations, and no collateral inquiry
as to whether they were legally or illegally secured will be permitted to inter-
rupt and disorganize the trial." People v. McDonald, 177 App. Div. 806, 810,
165 N. Y. Supp. 41, 45 (2d Dep't 1917).
48 176 N. Y. 351, 68 N. E. 636 (1903), aff'd, Adams v. New York, 192
U. S. 585 (1904).
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held that papers seized in violation of the federal constitutional pro-
vision protecting one against unreasonable searches and seizures 49
does not prevent their introduction into evidence if the owner is placed
on trial upon a criminal charge. The Adams case was given full sup-
port and extended to wire tapped evidence by People v. McDonald,50
when the court stated that "the doctrine of People v. Adams, . . . ,
is applicable to such a case [referring to wire tapped evidence] as
well as to the use of papers and documents." 51 But because of the
influence of the Supreme Court of the United States in Weeks v.
United States,5 2 some lower New York courts held that evidence
obtained by unlawful means must be returned to the party from whom
it was taken on his motion made before trial.53 Thus confusion
reigned in the New York courts until 1926, when People v. Defore 54
resolved all doubts as to New York's position. It held, in accord
with the Adams case, that evidence procured by an unlawful act is
admissible, and once more New York lined up solidly with the ma-
jority by assuming a position from which it has not since wavered. 55
With New York clearly accepting evidence secured pursuant to
Section 813-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and moreover, by
virtue of People v. McDonald 56 and the chain of cases supporting
the Adams case, even admitting information procured by violation of
Section 813-a,5 7 it can readily be seen that such a position is self-
49 U. S. CoNsr. AmEND. IV.
50 177 App. Div. 806, 165 N. Y. Supp. 41 (2d Dep't 1917).
51 Parenthetical material added. Id. at 810, 165 N. Y. Supp. at 45. See
also note 46 supra.
52232 U. S. 383 (1914).
53 People v. Manko, 189 N. Y. Supp. 357 (Sup. Ct. 1921), aff'd inern., 203
App. Div. 853, 196 N. Y. Supp. 944 (1st Dep't 1922) ; People v. Kinney, 185
N. Y. Supp. 645 (Sup. Ct. 1920) ; People v. Jakira, 118 Misc. 303, 193 N. Y.
Supp. 306 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
54242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926), aff'g 213 App. Div. 643, 211 N. Y.
Supp. 134 (1st Dep't 1925), cert. denied sub nomi., Defore v. New York, 270
U. S. 657 (1926).
55 While the doctrine of Weiss v. United States, supra note 43 and text,
and Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act denounced the introduc-
tion of wire tapped evidence into federal courts, the New York Court of
Appeals recently stated that "we are not persuaded that we are constrained
by the decision in Weiss v. United States, . . . , to condemn as illegal the
disclosure and divulgence, by use in evidence, of the intercepted messages which
were recorded by tapping wires in accordance with the statutes of the State
as expressly authorized by the Constitution of the State (N. Y. Const., art. I,
§ 12; Code Crim. Pro., § 813-a) .... A Federal statute, it is recognized, must
be presumed to be limited in effect to the Federal jurisdiction and not to super-
sede a State's exercise of its police power unless there be a clear manifestation
to the contrary." Matter of Harlem Check Cashing Corp. v. Bell, 296 N. Y.
15, 17, 68 N. E. 2d 854, 855 (1946). But see note 18 supra as to the proceed-
ing pending in the federal courts in regard to the constitutionality of New
York's constitutional and statutory provisions, which authorize wire tapping
if a court order is procured beforehand.
56 See note 49 supra.
57 See notes 45 and 46 supra.
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contradictory. On one hand New York denounces wire tapping as
a crime, and on the other hand, it accepts as evidence information
obtained by means of this very same unlawful tapping. Such an
attitude by the courts and by the legislature can only serve to en-
courage the violations which statutes like Section 552-a were designed
to eliminate. The only effective method to stamp out unlawful wire
tapping from the New York scene is to exclude wire tapped infor-
mation from admissibility as evidence, unless such information was
obtained pursuant to the procedure prescribed by Section 813-a. It
is submitted that until New York favorably inclines toward the fed-
eral view of inadmissibility of unauthorized wire tapped evidence, the
present view to which it adheres can only serve to hamper and make
futile the legislative decrees which condemn and denounce unlawful
wire tapping.
HARVEY L. LIPTON.
AMENDMENT TO THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW PER-
MITTING BENEFITS FOR INJURIES NOT ARISING OUT OF EMPLOY-
MENT-DISABILITY BENEFITS LAw.-"For some years, we have
been engaged in modernizing our social welfare programs through
various forms of social insurance ..... It is now time to take a com-
plete forward step in this program." ' The step referred to has been
effectuated by the enactment of the Disability Benefits Law in Article
9 of the New York Workmen's Compensation Law,2 which became
effective on April 13, 1949. Benefit payments under the Act will
commence on July 1, 1950.
Prior to the enactment of this Act a wage earner, if qualified,
could look to two sources of aid in time of need, i.e., workmen's
compensation and unemployment insurance.8 The workmen's com-
pensation fund provides benefits for those employees disabled by
occupational disease or by "disability or death from injury arising
out of and in the course of employment." 4 The unemployment in-
surance fund provides benefits for those individuals who are unem-
ployed but are "capable of and available for work." 5 It is to be
observed that there existed a gap between these two forms of social
insurance. Employees who became disabled from illness or injury
incurred outside of and in no way connected with their employment
1 Governor Dewey's annual message to the legislature, January 5, 1949.2 Laws of N. Y. 1949, c. 600.
3 For an interesting survey of the progress of New York in relation to
Workmen's Compensation, Unemployment Insurance and Disability Benefits see
Note, 24 ST. JoHN's L. Ray. - (1949).
4 N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATON LAW § 10.
5 N. Y. LABOR LAW § 522.
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